Attorney General John Ashcroft sends a letter to department heads telling them the Justice Department’s new agenda. He cites seven goals, but counterterrorism is not one of them. Yet just one day earlier, he testified before Congress and said of counterterrorism, “The Department of Justice has no higher priority.” [New York Times, 2/28/2002] Dale Watson, head of the FBI’s counterterrorism division, will later recall nearly falling out of his chair when he sees counterterrorism not mentioned as a goal. [9/11 Commission, 4/13/2004] Watson goes to see FBI Deputy Director Thomas Pickard and asks him, “Did you see this?” in what author Philip Shenon will describe as a “disgusted tone.” Pickard finds it hard to believe that Ashcroft’s office had accidentally left terrorism off the list, due to the focus on it elsewhere in the government. “If he didn’t think about it, his staff should have,” Pickard will recall thinking. [Shenon, 2008, pp. 246] In August, a strategic plan will be distributed, listing the same seven goals and 36 objectives. Thirteen objectives are highlighted, but the single objective relating to counterterrorism is not highlighted. [New York Times, 2/28/2002]
May 11, 2001: New York City Practices for Biological Terrorist Attack
New York City’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM), which is located in World Trade Center Building 7, organizes a bio-terrorism drill where militant extremists attack the city with bubonic plague and Manhattan is quarantined. The “tabletop exercise” is called RED Ex—meaning “Recognition, Evaluation, and Decision-Making Exercise”
—and involves about seventy different entities, agencies, and locales from the New York area. Federal legislation adopted in 1997 requires federal, state, and local authorities to conduct regular exercises as part of the Domestic Preparedness Program (DPP). The US Defense Department chose New York City as the venue for RED Ex due to its size, prominence, and level of emergency preparedness. Various high-level officials take part, including Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, OEM Director Richard Sheirer, Fire Commissioner Thomas Von Essen, and Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik. Agencies and organizations that participate include New York City Fire Department, New York City Police Department, the FBI, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The exercise is supposedly so intense that, according to one participant, “five minutes into that drill, everybody forgot it was a drill.”
[New York City Government, 5/11/2001; New York City Government, 9/5/2001, pp. 74 
; New York Sun, 12/20/2003; 9/11 Commission, 5/18/2004] According to OEM Director Richard Sheirer, “Operation RED Ex provided a proving ground and a great readiness training exercise for the many challenges the city routinely faces, such as weather events, heat emergencies, building collapses, fires, and public safety and health issues.”
[New York City Government, 5/11/2001] In his prepared testimony before the 9/11 Commission, Bernard Kerik later states: “The City, through its OEM, had coordinated plans for many types of emergencies; and those plans were tested frequently.” The types of emergencies they prepared for, he states, included “building collapses” and “plane crashes.”
[9/11 Commission, 5/18/2004 ] Considering Richard Sheirer’s comments, RED Ex appears to be one example where the city tests for building collapses. Details about training for airplanes crashing into New York City remain unknown. The second part of this exercise, called Tripod, is scheduled to take place in New York on September 12, 2001, but is cancelled due to the 9/11 attacks.
May 11, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Atta Is Seen Acting Suspiciously at Boston’s Logan Airport
Alleged 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta is seen by at least two people, examining the security checkpoints at Logan International Airport in Boston—the airport at which he will board Flight 11 on September 11—but no action is taken when the witnesses report their concerns about his suspicious behavior. [Sullivan, 12/23/2013 ; WCVB 5 (Boston), 10/6/2014]
Supervisor Sees Atta Filming a Security Checkpoint – Theresa Spagnuolo, a supervisor for Globe Aviation Services, sees a Middle Eastern man videotaping the main security checkpoint at the airport. The man, Spagnuolo will later describe, is between 5 feet 5 and 5 feet 6 tall, with one day’s beard growth. After 9/11, she will recognize him as Atta from photos she is shown by investigators and seeing Atta’s picture on television. Worried by the man’s behavior, she tells her supervisor, James Miller, what she has seen. Miller, though, says nothing can be done about her concerns because the man is in a public area. According to the New York Post, however, this is untrue. “[A]irport security had clear authority to investigate anybody surveilling a checkpoint,” it will state, “and [Atta’s] activity should have raised major red flags.” Shortly after 9/11, Miller will claim he has no recollection of this incident and his alleged conversation with Spagnuolo. [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 9/17/2001 ; New York Post, 10/5/2014]
Technician Sees Two Men Behaving Suspiciously – Meanwhile, Stephen Wallace, an American Airlines technician, notices two Middle Eastern men acting suspiciously sometime between 8:00 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. outside the main security checkpoint. He sees one of the men taking photos, and recording video of the checkpoint and the flight information display screens. He sees the other man speaking loudly in Arabic on a cell phone. Wallace will describe the men as having a dark complexion and being of medium height or perhaps slightly less than medium height. The man he sees talking on a cell phone has “no chin and dead eyes,” he will say. After 9/11, he will identify this man as Atta from photos he is shown by investigators. Whether he will be able to identify the other suspicious man is unstated. The two men are dressed like they are from Miami, Florida, Wallace will say. Atta is wearing a shiny grey shirt while the other man is wearing a tan shirt with stripes and flowers on it. Both men are wearing new leather shoes but no socks. Wallace observes them behaving suspiciously for about 45 minutes.
Port Authority Employees Think the Men Are Speaking Portuguese – Wallace alerts a couple of Massachusetts Port Authority employees who are nearby. He tells them the men have been taking photos, recording video, and talking Arabic on the phone. However, the Port Authority employees are apparently unconcerned. They tell Wallace the two men are “okay” and are speaking Portuguese, not Arabic. Wallace, though, is sure the men have been talking in Arabic.
Technician Questions the Suspicious Men – Due to his concerns, Wallace eventually walks up to the men and questions them about their carry-on luggage. They have what he will describe as “brand new” pilot bags with them. One of the bags is open and Wallace sees three disposable cameras, a video camera, files, and a cell phone in it. He points to a kiosk display of items that are prohibited on planes and says, “You guys don’t have any of this stuff in your bags, do you?” In response, one of the men addresses the other and refers to Wallace using an Arabic swear word while gesturing toward the technician. The two men then nervously pack up their bags and hurry toward another security checkpoint.
State Trooper Takes No Action – Wallace follows them and, before they reach it, alerts a Massachusetts state trooper to them. [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 9/17/2001 ; Merrill Corp., 7/17/2007 ; New York Post, 10/5/2014] He tells the state trooper: “These two clowns are up to something. They’ve been taking videos and pictures down at the checkpoint.” However, nothing is done in response to his concerns. The men are not stopped, questioned, or asked for IDs. [WCVB 5 (Boston), 10/6/2014] Wallace is unsure if they subsequently get on a plane but he thinks they board a flight to Washington, DC.
Action Today Could Have Prevented 9/11, Expert Will Say – There are no security cameras at the airport’s security checkpoints (see 1991-2000 and September 29, 2001), and so no images of Atta and his companion are recorded. Brian Sullivan, a retired special agent and risk management specialist for the Federal Aviation Administration, will express frustration at the lack of response to the sightings of Atta today when he learns of this incident after 9/11. “I’m convinced that had action been taken after the sighting of Atta, the 9/11 attacks, at least at Logan, could have been deterred,” he will say. Referring to Atta, the New York Post will comment, “[T]he worst terrorist hijacker in history was allowed to waltz through security without anyone stopping him, asking his name, checking his ticket, taking a picture, looking at his driver’s license or passport, opening his bags, or patting him down.” [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 9/17/2001 ; Merrill Corp., 7/17/2007 ; New York Post, 10/5/2014] Atta will again be seen behaving suspiciously at Logan Airport on September 9 (see September 9, 2001). [PBS, 1/17/2002; Associated Press, 5/28/2002; Guardian, 7/5/2002]
May 11-June 1, 2001: Deposits Made on 9/11 Hijackers’ Accounts, Source of Money Unknown
Several large deposits are made on the 9/11 hijacker pilots’ accounts. The joint SunTrust account of Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi receives $8,600 on May 11, $3,400 on May 22, and $8,000 on June 1, when $3,000 is also deposited in Ziad Jarrah’s SunTrust account. The 9/11 Commission will not identify the source of these funds, but will speculate that they may be from physically imported cash or traveler’s checks the investigation did not identify, or funds that were previously withdrawn, but not spent. [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 136-7 ] Alternatively, they may be related to the way in which Mohamed Atta distributes cash transferred to his US bank accounts (see Mid-July-Mid-August 2001).
May 13, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Alnami Leaves Saudi Arabia, Possibly Tracked by Saudi Authorities
9/11 hijacker Ahmed Alnami departs Saudi Arabia, traveling to the United Arab Emirates. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 10/2001, pp. 142 ] According to the 9/11 Commission, Alnami may have had a passport with an indicator of Islamic extremism (see April 21, 2001). Such indicators were used by the Saudi authorities to track some of the hijackers before 9/11 (see November 2, 2007).
May 15, 2001: CIA Hides Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit Information from the FBI
Tom Wilshire, a former deputy chief of the CIA’s bin Laden unit on attachment to the FBI, sends a request to CIA headquarters for the surveillance photos of the January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000). Three days later, Wilshire will explain the reason for his interest in an e-mail to a CIA analyst, writing, “I’m interested because Khalid Almihdhar’s two companions also were couriers of a sort, who traveled between [the Far East] and Los Angeles at the same time ([H]azmi and [S]alah).” Hazmi refers to future 9/11 hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi and Salah Said is the alias al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash traveled under during the summit. Apparently, Wilshire will receive the photos. Toward the end of May, a CIA analyst will contact a specialist working at FBI headquarters about the photographs. The CIA wants the FBI analyst to review the photographs and determine if a person who had carried money to Southeast Asia for bin Attash in January 2000 could be identified. The CIA will fail to tell the FBI analyst anything about Almihdhar or Alhazmi. Around the same time, the CIA analyst will receive an e-mail mentioning Alhazmi’s travel to the US. These two analysts will travel to New York the next month and again the CIA analyst will fail to divulge what he knows. [US Congress, 7/24/2003 ; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 283 ]
May 15, 2001: CIA Officer Again Accesses Cables about Hijackers’ Travel in Asia and to US, Fails to Alert FBI or Check If They Are Still in US
Tom Wilshire, a former deputy chief of the CIA’s bin Laden unit currently detailed to the FBI, accesses a number of cables about travel by 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi in 2000 (see March 5, 2000), but fails to draw the FBI’s attention to this or ask the INS whether they are still in the US. The cables report on Khalid Almihdhar’s travel to Malaysia in January 2000, his US visa, al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit, and Alhazmi’s travel from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to Bangkok, Thailand, with another person, and then to Los Angeles. Wilshire had previously blocked a notification to the FBI that Almihdhar had a US visa (see 9:30 a.m. – 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000). He writes to another CIA analyst about the travel (see May 15, 2001), but does not alert the FBI to the fact Alhazmi came to the US. Neither does he check with the INS to see whether Alhazmi and Almihdhar are in the country. When one of his colleagues finds these cables in late August, she will immediately check with the INS and become alarmed when she is told they are in the US (see August 21-22, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 266-8, 537; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 283 ] The 9/11 Commission will explain his failure to alert the FBI by saying he was focused on a possible terrorist attack in Malaysia: “Despite the US links evident in this traffic, [Wilshire] made no effort to determine whether any of these individuals was in the United States. He did not raise the possibility with his FBI counterpart. He was focused on Malaysia.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 268]
Mid-May 2001: CIA Manager Says Photo Identification Is Incorrect, Hinting He Has Greater Knowledge of Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit Figures
Tom Wilshire, a CIA officer detailed to the FBI, discusses three photographs of al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit (see January 5-8, 2000) with CIA analyst Clark Shannon. Based on an identification by a source inside al-Qaeda, one of the photos is thought to show al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash, who was involved in the bombing of the USS Cole (see January 4, 2001). However, Wilshire tells Shannon that he does not see bin Attash in any of the photos and that he is “missing something” or “someone saw something that wasn’t there.” Wilshire is correct—the photo actually shows 9/11 hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi not bin Attash, but it is unclear why Wilshire would think this; he has apparently not read the cable stating the source identified the man in the photo as bin Attash, but he is aware that bin Attash has been identified in the photo. The three photos will later be passed to the FBI and shown to investigators working on the bombing of the USS Cole (see Mid-May 2001, Late May, 2001, and June 11, 2001). [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 284-5 ]
Mid-May 2001: CIA Assigns Officer to Examine Malaysia Summit in Her Free Time
CIA manager Tom Wilshire recommends that an officer be assigned to review information about al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit, to see if there are any connections between it and the attack against the USS Cole. The task is assigned to Margaret Gillespie, an agent on loan from the FBI. Author Lawrence Wright will comment: “[B]ut [Wilshire] did not reveal that some of the participants might be in the United States. More important, he conveyed none of the urgency reflected in [an e-mail he sent his superiors around this time]; he told [Gillespie] that she should examine the material in her free time. She didn’t get around to it until the end of July.” Perhaps partially due to the request’s lack of urgency, it seemingly takes Gillespie three months to work out what Wilshire already knows: that some of the 9/11 hijackers have entered the US. One reason is that a database search conducted by Gillespie is incomplete (see (Late May-Early June)). However, Gillespie will alert one of Wilshire’s associates at the FBI to the men’s presence in the US in late August (see August 21-22, 2001). [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 297-8 ; New Yorker, 7/10/2006 ]
Mid-May 2001: CIA Withholds Photo of Al-Qaeda Leader from FBI
Although three surveillance photographs of al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit are passed to the FBI at this time (see Late May, 2001 and June 11, 2001), another key photograph the CIA has of the meeting is withheld by CIA officers Clark Shannon and Tom Wilshire. The key photograph shows al-Qaeda logistics manager Khallad bin Attash, who commanded the attack on the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000). Author Lawrence Wright will later comment: “Thanks to [FBI agent Ali] Soufan’s interrogation of [USS Cole bomber Fahad al-Quso], the Cole investigators had an active file on Khallad and were preparing to indict him. Knowledge of that fourth photo would likely have prompted [FBI manager John] O’Neill to demand that the CIA turn over all information relating to Khallad and his associates. By withholding the picture of Khallad attending the meeting with the future hijackers [Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi], the CIA may in effect have allowed the September 11th plot to proceed.” [New Yorker, 7/10/2006 ] The CIA also has video and even more photos of the meeting (see January 5, 2000 and January 5-8, 2000 and Shortly After), but these are not shared either, and it is unclear how aware Wilshire and Shannon are of this additional material.
